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     This paper investigates rationality of herd behavior in the accounting policy 
decisions by using a write-off policy of unfunded pension benefit obligation (UPBO) as a 
research material. Although the accounting standard for retirement benefits in Japan in 
2000 allowed the companies to choose the write-off period between one year and fifteen 
years depending on their write-off abilities, more than 60% of the companies disclosed 
the period within 3 years, especially one year before the balance sheet date. There 
might have been herd behavior in policy selections with the companies that currently 
reported poor income and nonetheless chose a short period of write-off policy.  We 
found that many of these companies did not unreasonably write–off UPBO and that the 
capital market saw through whether their write-off policies were concomitant with their 
capabilities or not.  If a market is efficient and participants are aware of it, accounting 
regulator’s policy for giving the companies the room for choice does not cause an 
irrational herd behavior in accounting policy.  
 
1. Introduction 
In June 1998 the Business Accounting Council of Japan issued “A Statement of 
Opinions on the Establishment of Accounting Standards for Retirement Benefits,” for the 
purpose of establishing accounting standards for corporate pension plans, etc. The 
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standards required a company to account for unfunded pension benefit obligation 
(UPBO) as the provision for retirement benefit on the balance sheet since the fiscal year 
commencing on or after April 1, 2000. It was predicted that the change from the old 
standard to the new standard would bring an awareness of large UPBO3, and it was 
feared that this may have a significant effect on corporate management. In response, 
the Business Accounting Deliberation Council, as a transitional measure at the time of 
the change in accounting standards, called UPBO that occurred at the time of transition 
Accounting Standards Transitional Difference (ASTD), and allowed the companies 
fifteen years to write-off the increase in liability over that which would have been 
recognized at the same date under the company’s previous accounting policy. The 
establishment of that write-off period left managers with substantial discretion 4 .     
However, many companies -more than 70% of sample companies5- responded to the 
inquiry of Nikkei and Nikkei Kinnyu Newspapers by explaining that they would choose a 
short period write–off policy in spite of the institutional consideration. An eventual herd 
behavior6
 
 was observed. 
(Please insert figure 1 here) 
 
                                                   
3 According to Nikkei Shimbun’s investigation of 230 of 300 companies (balance sheet date: March) in 
the Nikkei Index, the total amount (consolidation base) of UPBO for Japanese companies surveyed was 
9,780 billion yen.  Of the 9,780 billion yen, 5,100 was written off as extraordinary losses in March 2001. 
4 For example, as a potential remedy, the Tokyo Stock Exchange allowed the companies to add back the 
amount of UPBO write-off to net income when it was checking whether a company’s financial figures 
conflicted with the listed requirements or not.（For detail, see Okabe [2002]）。 
5 The sampling companies, which we used in this paper, are those that responded to the inquiries of 
Nikkei and Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun (from April 1999 to March 2002) with the amount of UPBO and its 
write-off period. Although 113/230 companies (49％) wrote-off their UPBO within one year according to 
the above investigation (note 1), 61% of the companies planned to write-off within one year according to 
our data. This might be because some of the companies that planned to write-off for a long period did not 
respond to the inquiries. 
6 The terms of herd behavior are used not only for the intended behaviors, but also for the eventual 
behaviors in this paper, according to Hirshleifer & Teoh [2001], Nakagawa [2002] and many other past 
researchers. As a result, there are two kinds of herd behaviors: a company intentionally follows a 




Precisely, there were two means of writing-off unrecognized UPBO: expensing the 
amount (at the same time, providing a same amount of liability) and contributing the 
amount of cash or financial instruments to the pension funds (see figure 1). It appears 
that the former is the problem of cost allocation, which does not influence cash flow, and 
the latter is literally a problem of cash flow. However, both of them are the same in 
evaluating the enterprise value as discounted future cash flow because the companies 
would have to pay directly to the employees or contribute the amount of money or 
financial instruments to the pension funds in order to write-off the provision for UPBO 
unless the short term worsening of operating performance and/or of financial positions 
cause the worsening of economic reality of the company through the various contracts.  
However, if the information of the change of allocation methods would include the 
additional inherent information of managers, this information may change the stock 
prices. In fact, the impact of this change on the stock price has been actually observed.  
On the one hand, the regulator allowed companies to write-off the same amount of 
ASTD within fifteen years only at the time of the accounting standard change. As a 
result, now, if those who need the information about a company can obtain additional 
information, it is “screening7,” from the regulator’s point of view, irrespective of their 
intentions. On the other hand, from the company side, it theoretically means 
“signaling8
If there is much irrational (deceiving on the face of accounting appearance) 
behavior in “herd behavior” concerning the write-off policy choice at the time of the 
.” 
                                                   
7 Screening is a method of causing persons to expose their attributes by causing them to make a choice, 
by presenting them with several alternatives where information on an attribute is unclear. The examples 
below are often given to illustrate self-selection. (1) When characteristics of an insurance company’s 
policyholders (risk of involvement in accidents, etc.) are unclear, the insurance company can induce 
policyholders to reveal characteristics by having them choose between a low premium or low indemnity 
product and a high premium or high guarantee product. (2) A company can induce employees to reveal 
characteristics (confidence in their own capabilities, etc.) by having them choose between an unregulated 
compensation plan and an annual salary system (Stiglitz [1993], pp.538-539, Nishimura [1995] pages 
319–321, Okuno & Suzumura [1988] pages 155–162 and 394).  
8 We will explain the definition of signaling in page 5. 
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accounting standard change9, institutional consideration did not realize as intended 
before10
This paper analyzes the rationality of herd behavior in accounting policy by using 
the data in the articles of two newspapers during the period between April 1999 and 
March 2002. It concerns the amount of UPBOs and their write-off periods, and verifies 
whether the accounting standard functioned as the institutional purpose or not.  
.  To make things worse, it might cause irrational herd behavior by giving 
companies the chance of “signaling,” by choosing other than the best policy.  
 
2. Discussion on Herd Behavior 
The words “herd behavior” are used in the various meanings: with or without 
intention (intentional or accidental), to whom it follows（the information advantageous 
precedent or the information cascade), and the rationality of results. 
Although the representative explanations are introduced below, the same “herd 
behavior” may be explained by plural theories because of plural axis of difference. The 
following explanations are not exclusive of each other. 
 
(1) Coincidence of Individual Rational Behaviors 
Apparent herd behavior (not following the others) occurs because each company 
chooses an alternative that it considers the most rational. For example, many banks 
begin to make a loan to the companies in the specified industry when they get the 
disclosed and/or private information that the industry shows as promising.  
 
(2) Inference from informed agents 
This type of herd behavior occurs when those who are in information 
disadvantage follow those who are in information advantage.  A typical case is as 
                                                   
9 Fukui [2002] indicated that avoiding irrational herd behavior is one of the important roles of accounting 
standards. 
10 Nakano [2004] refers to the possibility of irrational herd behavior in the write-off policy of UPBO. 
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follows: Japanese banks have been compartmentalized - on the one hand, small and 
medium sized banks (SMBs) have made a loan to small and medium sized companies 
(SMCs) and have accumulated the information about SMCs. On the other hand, large 
banks (LBs) have made loan to large companies and have accumulated the same the 
information about large companies (LCs).  However, as this compartmentalization 
collapses, which means occurrence of the mutual intervention of all banks, SMBs 
(information disadvantage) follow the way of loaning of LBs in making a loan to LCs 
(information advantage), and conversely, LBs (information disadvantage) follow the way 




There is an asymmetry in the knowledge of a company’s internal information 
(private information) between corporate managers and investors, and managers have 
superior access to information, while investors are at a disadvantage. Effective 
measures to alleviate this information asymmetry include (1) signaling by insiders 
(individuals with information advantage), or (2) inducing insiders to reveal their own 
attributes using a screening mechanism (Akerlof [1970], Spence [1973], Stigliz [1993]). 
The definition of signaling is as follows: among individuals with information 
advantage, with regard to a specific attribute, there is a high-quality group and a 
low-quality group. When under-informed parties cannot observe that attribute, they may 
try to distinguish the high-quality group from the low-quality group, bear the cost, and 
send a signal revealing their own quality level (Spence [1973]).  It is rational for a 
company to reveal the fact that it can write-off UPBO within the short period if it can 
actually afford to do so.  As a result, the companies which cannot afford to do so in the 
short period have the motivation to reveal the power to do so until they hurt their future 
performance.        
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If a company can improve the actual financial condition because its reputation 
grows by maintaining a facade of accounting performance, it might be rational.  If a 
manager has to sacrifice important things by adopting this policy and capital market 
participants know it, and if they cannot make a sharp distinction between the companies 
that have an actual lump-sum write-off power and the companies that maintain a façade 
of accounting figures, they may be misled in the direction which the latter companies 
want to move by maintaining it.      
Whether a capital market can or cannot see through a company that is doing more 
than what it can afford to do is a key point concerning the success and failure of this 
policy. If a company has known that maintaining a facade is effective because the 
market cannot see through the fact, this kind of herd behavior may frequently occur.   
 
(4) Information Cascade 
A few companies chose one of the alternatives, which they considered the most 
rational, at the early stage of implementation of the new accounting standard.  After 
that, the companies which confront the same choice may choose the same alternative 
either because they are scared that they will be suspected by the capital market of 
departing from the ‘standard’ (first small group’s choice) or because they thought they 
misjudged the situations, despite the idea that another alternative was the most rational.  
(Fukui [2002]). As a result, many companies follow the first group. The former 
information cascade is explained as follows: Companies are scared of the negative 
evaluation from the capital market due to the ‘standard’ deviation. This explains 
“signaling behavior.” The latter information cascade is explained as follows: The only 
reason that groups follow the first group is that the first group is the precedent, not 
based on their own judgments and not identified as an information advantage. 
Therefore, this explains irrational information cascade.    
Concerning the write-off of UPBO, there was the possibility of information cascade 
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because a wide variety of choices were initially observed and the number of the 
companies which wrote-off UPBO within one year gradually grew. However, ‘standard’ 
was not necessarily formulated in early times.  
 
3. Survey of Prior Researches 
 
In this section, we will survey prior researches which focused on herd behavior or 
analyzed ASTD write-off policy. 
 
(1) Herd behavior 
Firstly, prior researches concerning “herd behavior” are surveyed.  Scharfstein 
and Stein [1990] shows the model that managers tend to follow other managers’ 
investment behaviors in order to avoid a market degrading. They said that the possibility 
of application of this model for herd behaviors is in the case of firms’ facility investment, 
securities investment at capital market, and decision making in a company（voting 
behavior at the meeting） , etc. Bikhchandani and Sharma [2001] surveyed herd 
behaviors in capital markets and researched and showed the reasons why an investor 
follows investment behaviors of other investors and the structure of herd behavior.  
Nakagawa [2002] shows that Japanese SMBs loan to major companies by following 
LBs’ behaviors without their own judgments. Hisa [2007] defined that “herd behavior” is 
the coincidence of facility investments by firms in the same industry. It also 
demonstrates that there is a strong tendency for herd behavior in the industries which 
Japanese manufacturers control and there is a weak tendency in the industries which 
financial institutes and foreign manufacturers control. In the past, much of the research 
about herd behavior has been about investment in the capital markets, companies’ 




(2) Write-off policy of ASTD 
Next, we will review researches that investigate the factor influencing the 
manager’s decision making of ASTD write-off period. Firstly, we’ll explain the literatures 
which focused on relationship between write-off period and the effect on the net 
earnings. 
Hiki [2003], through investigation of the number of years over which ASTD was 
written-off, reported that (1) companies that were expected to fall into the red if they 
selected the lump-sum write-off option chose the long-term write-off option, (2) 
companies that were expected to end in the black if it chose the lump-sum write-off 
option selected the lump-sum write-off option within 1 year. Otomasa [2008,a] 
conducted a research similar to Hiki [2003], and found same result. In addition, 
Otomasa [2008,a], through multi-regression analysis that made the years of ASTD 
write-off as dependent variables, demonstrated a tendency of companies with large 
profit, ample internal reserves, and large total assets to select short-term write-off option. 
Choi and Tokuga [2007] found that well performing companies with a smaller ASTD 
companies made the choice of short-term write-off, by conducting logistic regression 
analysis with binary dependent variables on data of companies with short term write-off 
period. 
On the contrary, there were some literatures that referred to the possibilities that 
companies took no account of the effect on the figure of net earnings and reported their 
ASTD write-off period. Nakano [2004], after confirming the circumstance that almost half 
companies chose option of lump-sum write-off within one year, mentioned subjective 
opinion that there was one possibility some companies chose lump-sum write-off policy 
regardless of their write-off ability to take a same accounting policy as leader company 
in their industry (taking herd behavior) (Nakano [2004], p.145). 
Secondary, some literature pointed out the possibility that corporate managers 
decided the write-off period by considering not only effects on net profit, but also effects 
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on accounting figures embedded in contracts. The Business Accounting Council of 
Japan allowed a company to write-off ASTD as extraordinary losses if it would achieve 
its ASTD write-off within a five-year period, otherwise, the company was required to 
write-off ASTD as ordinary expense (selling, general and administrative expenses). In 
other words, if a company had some contracts incorporated with figures for ordinary 
profit and/or net asset which could be affected by net profit, there is a possibility that the 
contracts would influence the decision on the ASTD write-off period. Yoshida [2005], by 
focusing on the financial covenants attached at the time of bond issue, found that a 
company which had contracts incorporated with the treatment of ordinary profit 
maintenance preferred the short-term write-off option within five years to make its 
ordinary profit look better. And it also found that a company which had contracts with 
covenants of net assets maintenance attached preferred the long-term write-off option 
over five years in order to make its net profit look better (or to avoid reporting net loss). 
Otomasa [2008,b] pointed out that, in many cases, executive compensation would be 
determined based on the level of ordinary profit of their company. On that basis, he 
tested his hypothesis that a company which had a stronger linkage between executive 
bonus plans and the level of ordinary profit would select the short-term write-off option. 
However, evidence that the existence of executive bonus plan would affected the ASTD 
write-off period was not observed. 
Finally, we will refer to a research that investigates whether managers decisions 
about the period of write-off policy conveys some additional information to investors or 
not. Theoretically, the inter-period allocation of pension costs does not involve any cash 
flow effects in calculating periodic accounting income, and hence has no influence on 
the value of a company. Therefore, the value of a company is not expected to change 
depending on the number of years over which unfunded pension liability is written off, as 
the length of write-off period only involves differential inter-period cost allocations. On 
the other hand, the choice of a cost allocation scheme per se may serve as an indicator 
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of potential profitability or future cash flow prospect of a company and thus, could 
influence the expectation of investors. 
Regarding the information content about the change of allocation methods, there 
has been research about the depreciation expense. The research is about the time 
series variation of stock prices of companies that increased their reported incomes, 
owing to the change from the accelerated method to the straight line method (Kaplan 
and Roll [1972], Archibald [1972]). Based on the research, a positive reaction in capital 
market was observed in the vicinity of income reporting, though the reaction reversed 
extremely to negative after that.  This means that the capital markets obtain the 
additional information from the information about depreciation methods and/or their 
changes11
Taking those researches’ results into our consideration, we can assume the 
possibility that the difference of ASTD write-off policy would effect on the corporate 
value. Choi and Tokuga [2007], focusing on the length of write-off period, implemented 
an event study that took the day a company disclosed their write-off policy as the event 
day. In their results, they demonstrated that a significant positive effect on the stock 
price was observed, when a company announced its choice of short-term write-off 
option, and a significant negative effect on the stock price was observed when a 
company disclosed its selection of long-term write-off option. Consequently, managers’ 
periodic decisions on the ASTD write-off policy had signaling effects to investors. 
. 
As we reviewed above, there are few prior researches that investigated the herd 
behavior in accounting policy. Moreover, while some literatures studied market reaction 
to the length of ASTD write-off period, there is no literature which tested market 
reaction to the write-off policy disclosure in the viewpoint of herd behavior.  
 
                                                   
11 Concerning the companies that changed depreciation methods in Japan, however, stock price change 
was not observed in a few researches which verified the relationship between reported income and stock 
price ( Sakurai [1991], pp. 333-359, Otogawa [1999], pp. 119-137). 
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4. Research Design 
 
In this section, we will discuss the research design which we would use in this 
paper. As mentioned in section 1, when the new retirement benefits accounting 
standards were introduced, managers were given the discretion to set the ASTD 
write-off period.  Managers had to make a long term decision because the write-off 
periods might span long periods of time.  Investors should also know it.  Because of 
the effects of the transitional measures, poorly-performing companies often find that 
they must select the long-term ASTD write-off.  Therefore, investors also assume that 
well-performing companies select the short-term write-off, and poorly-performing 
companies select the long-term write-off（① and ④ of figure 2）. However, there is the 
possibility of “herd behaviors” in categories other than those combinations（② and ③ 
of figure 2）. If well-performing companies dare to select the long term write-off, they 
reveal the fact of ‘having no positive factors in the future’ or of their ‘real performance’ 
being worse than the currently reported income. Therefore, it is not expected to be so 
many because these companies should not have such incentives, though there may 
actually be the case of ‘having no positive factors in the future’ in this category. On the 
other hand, if poorly-performing companies select the short term write-off, they give the 
signal of having some positive factors in the future. Therefore, it is expected to be many 
because these companies should have such strong incentives. We focused on the 
poorly performed companies that selected the short term write-off of ASTD and we 
called them ‘herd behavior companies.” 
 
(Please insert figure 2 here) 
 
Herd behavior companies combined ‘companies with positive factors in the future’   
with ‘companies without positive factors in the future.’ In the case of the former, it is 
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rational for companies to select the short term write-off, which means ‘rational herd 
behaviors.’  In the case of the latter, it is rational for companies to select the long term 
write-off. However, they chose the short term write-off in order to follow the others. It is 
an irrational selection because they did more than possible based on the conditions.  
Therefore, we divided herd behavior companies into two categories: well performing 
companies in the future, and poorly performing companies in the future12
Next, the conditions for the success of signaling, ‘having positive factors in the 
future’ for irrational herd behavior companies, are as follows: (1) the sacrifice 
(worsening of current performance) is sufficiently large and (2) the capital market is 
misled (deceived).  The first condition is fulfilled because they abandoned the right to 
be able to write-off ASTD for 15 years, which means that they gave up showing the 
current well performance. However, verification is needed for the second condition. We 
will prepare the following hypothesis to verify whether the capital market could 
distinguish between the companies that could afford to write-off in the short period or 
could do more than possible among the companies that chose the short term write-off 
policy in spite of current poor performance.  
. On the one 
hand, the former is called ‘rational herd behavior companies.’  On the other hand, the 
latter is called ‘irrational herd behavior companies’ 
 
H1：When a company with bad performance announces its choice of the short-term  
write-off policy, in case its policy does not bring an excessive burden to the  
company, this gives rise to a positive effect on the stock price. 
 
                                                   
12 The short term write-off naturally has positive influence on the future performance of the companies 
because it means advance recognition of future expense.  Therefore, we use the reported income of 5 
years later as future performance.   
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H2：When a company with bad performance announces its choice of the short-term 
write-off policy, in case its policy brings an excessive burden to the company, this 
gives rise to a negative effect on the stock price. 
 
     In this paper, we specified subsample of herd behavior company form sample of 
424 companies, each of which had to satisfy the criteria listed below in items (1) to (6). 
 
(1) There must have been an article discussing the company’s ASTD write-off period in  
the Nihon Keizai Shimbun or the Nihon Keizai Kinyu Shimbun during the period  
April 1999 – March 2002. 
(2) Subject companies must have posted an increase in ASTD (unfunded) arising from  
the change in accounting standards, and the number of years in the write-off period  
had to be specified. 
(3) Subject companies had to be listed on the first or second sections of the Tokyo Stock  
Exchange. 
(4) The fiscal years of the subject companies had to end on March 31. 
(5) Complete consolidated financial statements and stock price information had to be  
available. 
(6) Subject companies could not be connected with the banking industry. 
 
Criterion (1) was established to allow the identification of the days on which a large 
number of investors received information regarding the announcements of ASTD 
write-off policies. This was necessary to verify the response of securities markets to 
these announcements, which was the purpose of the study. Where the Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun and the Nihon Keizai Kinyuu Shimbun both published articles, but on different 
days, the article published on the earlier date was used as the sample. Criterion (2) was 
added because this study is focused on the decisions of corporate managers regarding 
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the write-off periods for liabilities. Criterion (3) was added because publicly listed 
companies were required for the verification of the effects on stock prices, and after 
careful consideration of the availability of data. If some subject companies ended their 
fiscal years at significantly separated points in time, it would have been difficult to 
determine which period’s corporate performance was affected by the ASTD write-off 
policies. In order to avoid this, criterion (4) was added. Criterion (5) was set because the 
relevant data were required to evaluate the strength of corporate performance and to 
verify the effects on stock prices. Criterion (6) excluded companies from the banking 
industry, whose structure of financial statements differs from that of companies in other 
industries. Newspaper articles were taken from the Nikkei Telecom database, while 
accounting and stock price data were obtained from the Bloomberg database. 
Next, we will discuss the configuration of the subsample. For this study, companies 
that are writing off their ASTD within three years were designated as “short-term 
write-off companies,” and taking more than three years were designated as “long-term 
write-off companies.” The reasons for dividing the categories were (1) The average 
write-off period for the study sample was 3.81 years, (2) By using the same standard as 
Choi and Tokuga [2007], we maintained consistency with the previous research. 
Companies were designated as well performing or poorly performing in 
accordance with the criteria given below. We controlled differences in company size by 
dividing the operating income of each company for the fiscal year of its announcement 
event by its total assets. Then, we calculated the median value for the entire sample. 
Companies that exceeded the median were put into the well-performing company 
subset, and those that came below the median were designated as poorly-performing 
companies13
                                                   
13 Return on assets within the study sample was 0.0297. Statistics for incorporated businesses show 
industry-wide average return on assets for each fiscal year from fiscal 1999 through fiscal 2001 as 0.0227, 
0.0289, and 0.0239, respectively; accordingly, it is considered that this paper makes rather difficult 
judgments regarding the strength of corporate performance. 
. Operating income was used because it was critical that each company 
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has sufficient profit from the core businesses to afford the ASTD write-off costs. 
We have to distinguish between rational herd behavior companies and irrational 
ones to verify H1 and H2. We define companies whose figure of net income before 
starting its ASTD write-off improve in five years later as “rational herd behavior 
companies”, and we define the other companies as “irrational herd behavior 
companies”. 
In this paper, we analyzed the response of securities markets to the announcement 
of companies’ ASTD write-off policies, before and after the announcements; specifically, 
taking the day of publication, by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun or Nihon Keizai Kinyuu 
Shimbun, of an article on ASTD write-off policies as the event day, we conducted an 
event study focused on stock price trends during the period from seven days before the 
event day until seven days after the event day. This event study assumed a condition of 
semi-strong form efficiency in the securities markets, and measured the difference 
between the rate of change in expected stock prices and the rate of change in actual 
stock prices. Using this analytical method, we confirmed whether there is additional 
information content within the announcement event. In this analysis, the rate of change 
in TOPIX was used as the market’s expected return, and the abnormal return of each 
trading name was calculated using the equation below. 
 
 
Where, AR: The abnormal return of company i at time t 
P: Company i stock price at close of trading day at time t 
M: Closing value of TOPIX at time t 
t: From −7 to +7 
 
Next, the AR values for each sample at each point in time were added, then divided 
by the number of companies in the sample, which yielded the average abnormal return 
ARi,t = ��Pi,t − Pi,t−1�/Pi,t−1�  − {(Mt −Mt−1)/Mt−1} 
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(AAR) of the study sample. The three-day cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) 
C was calculated by adding the AAR values for time t, the day previous, and the day 





Where, N is the number of companies in the sample. 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics and Result of Event Study 
 
In this section, we discuss the result of analysis. Figure 3 is a cross-tabulation 
table showing these subsamples. The study sample numbered 424 companies, divided 
into 292 short-term write-off companies and 132 long-term write-off companies. Thus, 
we observed that approximately two-thirds of companies selected short-term write-off. 
In addition, the number of poorly performing companies which adopted lump-sum 
write-off was shown in the round bracket of Figure 3, and we found that these 
companies made up more than 60% of the total sample. 
There is a possibility that the transitional measure which allowed companies to 
write-off ASTD as extraordinary loss only if they would achieve their ASTD write-off 
within five years caused the companies to select lump-sum write-off policy. However, if 
mid-term write-off policies were favorable for the companies, their optimal choices must 
be to write-off ASTD in five years. Therefore, we think that the beneficial measure may 
not be an important factor to influence manager’s decision on the length of ASTD 
write-off period because most companies of the sample selected to write-off ASTD in 
three years and the proportion of lump-sum write-off companies to the total sample was 
high. 
AARt = 1N × �ARi,tNi=1  CAARt[t− 1, t + 1] = � AARtt+1t=t−1  
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(Please insert figure 3 here) 
 
Next, we will confirm the time series change in adoption rate of lump-sum write-off 
of ASTD. If it has risen dramatically, information cascade could occur when companies 
determined their period of ASTD write-off policies. Figure 4 is a table listing the change 
in adoption rate of lump-sum write-off of ASTD from April 1999 to March 2002. In the 
implementation of the new accounting standard for pension benefit obligation, the 
Business Accounting Deliberation Council permitted companies to select the timing 
when they would apply the new standard to themselves among three types; mandatory 
implementation ( from April 2000 to March 2001), early implementation ( from April 1999 
to March 2000 ), and delayed implementation ( April 2001 to March 2002 ). We can 
observe that the selection rate of lump-sum write-off policy rose from 30.8 percent to 
67.7 percent, without taking delayed implementation companies which couldn’t afford to 
apply the new accounting standard to them by mandatory date into consideration. This 
increase was not as sharp as so called “dramatic change”, nevertheless we cannot 
deny the possibility that information cascade occurred in the companies’ choice of 
lump-sum write-off policy. 
 
(Please insert figure 4 here) 
 
In this paper, we regard the companies which made choice of short-term write-off 
policy of ASTD regardless of their less performance as herd behavior companies. And 
then we can obtain 133 samples of herd behavior companies shown in Figure 3. About 
90 percent of herd behavior companies adopted lump-sum write-off policy. Therefore we 
can’t exclude the possibility that the herd behavior companies’ write-off policy was 
affected by information cascade, and the economic rationality of their choice has to be 
verified. We divided 133 companies into rational herd behavior companies and irrational 
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herd behavior companies based on the criteria explained in section 4. Figure 5 provides 
the number of the former is 98 and the number of the latter is 29 (we can’t get figures of 
the other six companies’ net income because they were absorbed in absorbed type of 
merger and de-listed). Consequently, more than 73 percent of herd behavior companies 
chose their write-off period within their write-off abilities. Thus, the choice of short-term 
write-off could be explained as rational behavior. 
 
(Please insert figure 5 here) 
 
     Next, we will discuss the results of event study conducted to verify whether the 
capital market incorporates the difference of herd behavior’s rationality into the stock 
price. The statistical test method used to determine the significance of AAR and CAAR 
figures is the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, a type of non-parametric test14
 
. 
(Please insert figure 6 and 7 here) 
 
Figure 6 and 7 show the results of event study that was conducted to test H1 and 
H2. Figure 6 is a graphical representation of the changes in CAAR on and around the 
event days. While numerous observations of rational herd behavior companies showed 
that CAAR displayed positive values, observations of irrational herd behavior 
companies showed that CAAR dropped conspicuously into negative values around the 
announcements of their write-off policies.  
Figure 7 shows AAR and CAAR values and their significance, and then Panel A 
lists the result concerning rational herd behavior companies and Panel B contains the 
result concerning irrational herd behavior companies, respectively. AR value in Panel A 
                                                   
14 (1) No normal probability distribution was conducted on the study sample’s stock returns. (2) As 
shown in Figure 2, after consideration of the existence of subsamples numbering as fewer than 100 
companies, it was decided that a non-parametric test would be performed. 
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reports positive trend around the event day 0, which is not significant. However, AAR for 
event day +5 shows -0.480%, which is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. 
Also, AAR for event day +6 shows +0.426%, which is significantly different from zero at 
the 0.10 level. We can’t find substantial change in AAR, because AAR +6 offsets against 
AAR +5. CAAR value in Panel B illustrates positive trend around the event day 0, which 
is significant. The evidence indicates that when poorly-performing companies 
announced short-term write-off policies of ASTD, if their policies were proportionate to 
their future profitability, a stock market perceived their write-off policies as favorable. 
Consequently, H1 was supported. 
On the other hand, Panel B documents that AAR for event day 0 indicates 
-1.629%, which is significantly different from zero, and CAAR value for event day 0 also 
shows -2.744%, which is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. Therefore the 
evidence supposes that when poorly-performing companies announced short-term 
write-off policies of ASTD, if their choices were beyond their write-off power, investors 
perceived their write-off policies as unfavorable. Consequently, H2 was supported. 
 
6. Regression Analysis 
 
In previous section, we showed the results of event study which tested the market 
reaction to news of ASTD write-off policies. However, the announcement of company’s 
write-off policy would convey the information of not only write-off period but also the 
amount of ASTD. Moreover, the capital market might evaluate the adequacy of the 
write-off policy in consideration of company’s write-off ability. Therefore, we need to 
verify whether the rationality of decisions on ASTD write-off period would have 
explanatory power to the change in CAAR at the announcement day under controlling 
those factor mentioned above. Thereupon, in this section, we will address additional 
analysis by using regression model in order to control the other factors. 
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Yoshida [2002] reported that the amount of UPBO had negative co-relationship 
with the stock price. Therefore, we will add ASTD to our regression model as control 
variable whose expected sign of coefficient is negative, and ASTD denotes the amount 
of accounting standards transitional difference standardized by the amount of total 
assets (average number of the beginning and the ending balance; hereinafter the same 
meaning shall apply). Next, Choi and Tokuga [2007] and Otomasa [2008, a] found that 
well-performing companies preferred to write-off ASTD in short term. These evidences 
indicate that the amount of earnings will function as proxy of company’s reserve power 
for ASTD write-off. Therefore, we will add ERN to our model as control variable. ERN 
denotes the figure of net income at the beginning of the period when a company 
announced its write-off policy, which is standardized by the amount of total assets. 
Expected sign of ERN is positive. In addition, Otomasa [2008, a] demonstrated negative 
association between the amount of company’s net asset and write-off period of ASTD. 
Therefore, we will add BV to our regression model and BV denotes the amount of the 
net asset (average number of the beginning and the ending balance) standardized by 
the amount of total assets. Finally, Tokuga [1999] showed the tendency of a larger scale 
company (specifically, in terms of the amount of total assets, revenue, ordinary income, 
and number of employees) to voluntarily embark on a trial estimate of projected benefit 
obligation. And Otomasa [2008,a] provided the evidence that the large scale companies 
chose short-term write-off. These results suggest that corporate scale will function as 
proxy of company’s ASTD write-off ability. Therefore, we will add Asset to our model as 
control variable, and Asset computed as the logarithm of the amount of total assets. BV 
and Asset are the proxy of the reserve strength for write-off of ASTD, and their expected 
sign of coefficient are positive, respectively. 
Besides control variables described above, we will set ROH as dummy variable for 
the rationality of herd behavior. ROH binary variable equals “1” if a company’s write-off 
policy is within its write-off power, and equals “0” if a company’s write-off policy is 
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beyond its write-off ability. If the coefficient of ROH shows positive in our regression 
model including control variables, H1 and H2 could be supported. We will test H1 and H2 
by using five regression models written as follows. 
 
Model 1：CAAR = α + β1ASTD + β2ROH + ε 
Model 2：CAAR = α + β1ASTD + β2ROH + β3ERN + ε 
Model 3：CAAR = α + β1ASTD + β2ROH                    + β4BV + ε 
Model 4：CAAR = α + β1ASTD + β2ROH + β3ERN + β4BV + ε 
Model 5：CAAR = α + β1ASTD + β2ROH + β3ERN + β4BV + β5 Asset + ε 
 
 (Please insert figure 9 and 10 here) 
 
Figure 8 shows basic statistics of each variable. Many observations of 
experimental sample show “1” in the ROH distribution because rational herd behavior 
companies account for 73% of herd behavior companies. In addition, the distribution of 
ERN variable skewed left because its minimum value is large negative. With respect to 
the distribution of the other variables, we cannot observe any remarkable features. 
Next, figure 9 describes Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient of each variable. 
Although we can observe a little high correlation between BV and Asset, absolute value 
of the other variable’s correlation coefficient shows less 0.250. Therefore, there may be 
less possibilities of the existence of multicollinearity15
 
. 
(Please insert figure 11 here) 
 
Figure 10 lists the result of regression analysis by using regression estimation 
                                                   
15 When we estimated regression model (5) which included all independent variables, the value of VIF of 
each variable indicated around 1. Generally speaking, if the value of VIF is below 10, there is no risk that 
estimated regression model is affected by multicollinearity. 
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models which adopt CAAR as dependent variable and ASTD, ROH, ERN, BV, and 
Asset as independent variables. All regression models provide that the estimated sign 
of coefficient of ROH shows positive value, which is significantly different from zero at 
the 0.05 level. On the contrary, control variables using accounting figure have no 
explanatory power to CAAR for event day 0 statistically. These results were affected by 
the factor that CAAR is calculated at the time of not account day but the announcement 
day of ASTD write-off policy. These evidences from regression analysis indicate that the 
change in CAAR for the day of ASTD write-off policy announcement could be explained 
by the rationality of write-off policy under controlling the other factors. Consequently, a 




This paper verified rationality of “herd behavior” in accounting policy by using 
write-off policies of UPBO as the research subject.  The possibility of herd behavior 
due to information cascade cannot be denied because the proportion of companies 
which adopt a year write-off policy grew according to our inquiries about the time series 
variation. Among herd behaviors, there are both rational and irrational herd behaviors 
due to information cascade. The research was to verify rationality of herd behavior 
focusing on the companies which chose the short term write-off in spite of low reporting 
income. As a result, we found that a large majority of companies adopted the rational 
policies.   
By researching the reaction of the capital market to disclose information about the 
write-off policies in the newspapers, we also found that the capital market could see 
through whether the write-off policy each company adopted earned its real power or not. 
This means that the screening, which the standard setter offered, was successful if the 
market is effective. The implication of this result is that irrational herd behavior is little.  
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The companies, which had expensed a large amount of UBPO, had to contribute 
financial instruments to the pension funds to extinguish the increasing amount of 
provisions due to this new standard.  Although our analysis considers the future (5 
years later) reporting income as the companies’ real write-off powers, we will have to 
tackle additional research regarding the proportion of extinguishment for these 
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           Companies      Companies           Totals 
 performing well    performing poorly   
   Short-term      159                133           292     68.9% 
Write-off                                     
   (Lump-sum      (142)               (118)         (260)    (61.3%) 
Write-off) 
   Long-term        54                 78           132    31.1% 
Write-off  
   Totals       213                211          424   100.0% 
 
①〔Expected Combination〕 
Companies performing well adopt 
short-term write-off policies. 
②〔Unexpected Combination〕 
Companies performing well adopt 
long-term write-off policies. 
④〔Expected Combination〕 
Companies performing poorly 
adopt long- term write-off policies. 
③〔Unexpected Combination〕 
Companies performing poorly 
adopt short-term write-off policies. 
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≪Figure 4≫ Longitudinal Change in Adoption Rate of Lump-Sum Write-Off Policy 
 
 
≪Figure 5≫ Rationality of Herd Behavior 
 
 





          April,1999 - Oct,1999 -  April,2000 – Oct,2000 -  April, 2001 - Oct, 2001 - 
Sept,1999   March,2000 Sept,2000  March,2001 Sept,2001    March,2002 
Companies Which     
Announced           13         68        171        124         34        14 
Write-Off Policy 
Lump-Sum           4         39        113         84         19          1 
Write-Off 
Except Above         9         29         58         40         15         13 
Adoption Rate       
Of Lump-Sum         30.8%     57.4%     66.1%     67.7%      55.9%      7.1% 
Write-Off Policy      
Early Application Mandatory Application Delayed Application 
 
       Future Performance   Well Performing   Poor Performing   Unidentified    
           [ Rational          [ Irrational                    Total 
      Herd Behavior ]   Herd Behavior]      
Poor Performing 
and Short-Term                     98                29             6        133 
Write-Off Companies        
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Time denotes event day relative to write-off policy announcement day. AAR and CAAR are average 
abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return for day t to the portfolio of subsample, 
respectively. Wilcoxon Z and p-value report Z-statistics and p-value for signed rank test. ***, **, *, denote 
significance level at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Time    AAR (%)   Wilcoxon Z    p-value     CAAR (%)   Wilcoxon Z    p-value 
 －6     0.590**      2.294        0.022      
 －5     0.042        0.083        0.934       0.963**      2.241        0.025 
 －4     0.331*       1.749        0.080       0.557        1.075        0.282 
 －3     0.184        0.310        0.757       0.448        0.360        0.719 
 －2   －0.067        0.229        0.819       0.540        0.898        0.369 
 －1     0.423        1.426        0.154       0.420        0.611        0.541 
   0     0.064        0.650        0.516       1.266**      1.997        0.046 
 ＋1     0.779        1.401        0.161       1.061*       1.692        0.091 
 ＋2     0.218        1.132        0.258       1.060**      2.429        0.015 
 ＋3     0.063        0.601        0.548       0.345        0.813        0.416 
 ＋4     0.064        0.314        0.754     －0.353        1.164        0.244 
 ＋5   －0.480**      2.156        0.031       0.010        0.434        0.664 
 ＋6     0.426*       1.837        0.066     －0.110        0.930        0.352 
 ＋7   －0.056        0.941        0.347 
Time    AAR (%)   Wilcoxon Z     p-value    CAAR (%)   Wilcoxon Z    p-value 
 －6     0.725        0.032        0.974      
 －5     1.637*       1.892        0.058       2.131        1.157        0.247 
 －4   －0.231        0.292        0.770       1.894        1.633        0.103 
 －3     0.488        0.551        0.581       0.692        0.465        0.642 
 －2     0.435        0.638        0.524       0.069        0.422        0.673 
 －1   －0.854        1.070        0.284     －2.048        1.114        0.265 
   0   －1.629*       1.870        0.061     －2.744**      2.000        0.045 
 ＋1   －0.261        0.141        0.888     －1.173        0.638        0.524 
 ＋2    0.717        0.854        0.393       0.926        0.054        0.957 
＋3     0.470        1.070        0.284       1.298        1.568        0.117 
 ＋4     0.111        0.011        0.991       0.996        0.638        0.524 
 ＋5     0.415        0.487        0.627       1.377        1.416        0.157 
 ＋6     0.851        1.330        0.184       1.495        1.611        0.107 
 ＋7     0.229        0.465        0.642 
Panel A: Rational Herd Behavior Companies 
Panel B: Irrational Herd Behavior Companies 
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≪Figure 8≫ Basic Statistics 
 
 











CAAR      ASTD     ROH      ERN      BV      Asset 
N             127        127       127       127      127       127 
Min        －0.1367     0.0021       0    －0.1214    0.0151    4.4060 
1st Q       －0.0248     0.0214       1      0.0008    0.2610    5.2147 
Media        0.0064     0.0438       1      0.0048    0.3494    5.5873 
3rdQ         0.0273     0.0879       1      0.0091    0.4640    5.9521 
Max          0.2028     0.2302       1      0.0298    0.7995    6.9098 
Mean         0.0055     0.0606    0.7717  －0.0023    0.3578    5.6177 
STDEV       0.0511     0.0506    0.4214    0.0236    0.1500    0.5512 
 
 
              CAAR     ASTD     ROH      ERN      BV      Asset 
CAAR        1.000   －0.086      0.184     0.003   －0.117     0.166 
ASTD        －      1.000    －0.116     0.009     0.233   －0.104 
ROH           －        －       1.000   －0.178     0.015   －0.051 
ERN           －     －       －       1.000     0.095   －0.038  
BV             －        －        －        －       1.000   －0.580 




≪Figure 10≫ Result of Regulation Analysis 
 
CAAR is cumulative average abnormal return for day 0 to the portfolio of subsample. ASTD is the 
amount of accounting standard transitional difference divided by total asset. ROH is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if a company’s write-off policy has rationality, and otherwise 0. ERN denotes the figure of 
net income at the beginning of the accounting period when a company announced its write-off policy 
divided by total asset. BV is the amount of net asset divided by total asset. Asset denotes the logarithm of 
the amount of total asset. DW is Durbin-Watson ratio. ***, **, *, denote significance level at the 1 percent, 












               Intercept      ASTD       ROH       ERN       BV       Asset      adjR2    DW 
                                                                                                   
  Model 1   coefficient       0.014**    －0.067       0.021**      ―     ―         ―       0.023    1.619 
             t - value        1.993      －0.744       1.990 
             p - value        0.048        0.458       0.049 
  Model 2   coefficient     －0.007      －0.066       0.022**     0.078       ―         ―       0.016    1.613 
             t - value      －0.649      －0.737       2.023       0.401 
             p - value        0.517        0.463       0.045       0.689 
  Model 3   coefficient       0.004      －0.040       0.022**      ―     －0.038      ―       0.027    1.621 
             t - value        0.305      －0.435       2.046                 －1.226  
             p - value        0.761        0.665       0.043                   0.223 
  Model 4   coefficient       0.004      －0.038       0.023**     0.104     －0.040      ―       0.021    1.610 
             t - value        0.299      －0.413       2.104       0.534     －1.272  
             p - value        0.765        0.680       0.037       0.594       0.206 
  Model 5   coefficient   －0.091      －0.043    0.024**     0.100     －0.007     0.015     0.031    1.587 
             t - value    －1.388      －0.466       2.178       0.517     －0.194     1.492 
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